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We investigate the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed 
firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow-sensitive. Is this suboptimal 
investment policy the result of agency problems when managers with high discretion 
overinvest,  or  of  asymmetric  information  when  managers  owning  equity  are 
underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find 
that the observed cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash 
flow.  The  magnitude  of  the  relationship  depends  on  insider  ownership  in  a  non-
monotonic  way.  Furthermore, we  obtain that  outside blockholders, such as financial 
institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce 
the  cash  flow  sensitivity  of  investment  via  effective  monitoring.  Finally,  financial 
institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms 
and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based 
on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In perfect and complete markets, investment decisions of a firm are independent from its financial 
situation  (Modigliani  and  Miller,  1958).  Firms  undertake  investment  projects  if  and  only  if  the 
present value of discounted cash flows exceeds the associated capital expenditure. In other words, 
firms invest as long as the marginal dollar of the capital expenditure generates at least one dollar of a 
present value of cash flows (Tobin, 1969). Moreover, there is no capital rationing since firms can 
always obtain external financing at a cost equal to their (true) cost of capital. However, in imperfect 
or incomplete markets the financial structure of a firm becomes relevant. For example, if the capital 
markets’  participants  face  significant  uncertainty  about  the  firm’s  future  prospects,  the  cost  of 
external capital often exceeds the cost of internal financing.  
In general, there are a number of factors that make a firm’s investment policy depend on its 
financial position. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), owners-managers of a levered firm 
tend  to  overinvest  and  choose  too  risky  (and  often  negative  NPV)  projects  due  to  their  limited 
liability. Myers (1977) shows that capital structure can influence investment decisions even without 
apparent market imperfections: risky debt may lead to underinvestment due to the wealth transfer 
from shareholders to creditors that occurs upon investment. Myers and Majluf (1984) also discuss 
how  investment  policy  depends  on  the  way  a  firm  is  financed.  They  show  that  asymmetric 
information between a firm and the capital markets may result in the rejection of good investment 
opportunities because the providers of external capital include into the cost of capital a risk premium 
reflecting the risk of an average investment project. A similar rationale is developed by Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981), who describe how asymmetric information may result in the rationing of debt finance 
(which can be viewed as an infinite cost of external financing beyond its certain level). Finally, 
according  to  Jensen  (1986),  suboptimal  investment  can  occur  due  to  agency  costs  between 
shareholders and management, when the latter’s objective function does not reflect the interests of 
shareholders. 
While the above shows that investment policy can be explained by many theories involving 
the choice of financing (debt versus equity, outside equity versus internally generated funds), agency   3 
costs (management versus monitoring blockholders), asymmetric information (between management 
and the providers of external equity) and moral hazard (the choice of risk of an investment project), 
we address a narrower research question in this paper. Namely, we intend to investigate why the level 
of corporate investments depends on the firm’s available free cash flow. In other words, we examine 
the reasons why investment is sensitive to the firm’s cash flow, as observed in their seminal work by 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (hereafter FHP, 1988). In principle, this sensitivity will be observed if 
(i) there is a wedge between the cost of internal and external financing, and (ii) the decision to spend 
a marginal unit of internally generated funds is consistent with the utility maximization problem of 
top  management.  Consequently,  the  observed  sensitivity  can  be  attributed  either  to  asymmetric 
information problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or to agency costs of free 
cash flow (Jensen, 1986), for which conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied.
1 In general, it is possible that 
some firms exhibit a high investment-cash flow sensitivity due to informational asymmetries (such 
firms would underinvest), whereas others may suffer from overinvestment attributable to the agency 
costs of free cash flow. 
Asymmetric information may lead to the rejection of good investment opportunities because 
external  financing  may  be  deemed  overly  expensive  by  the  management  (whose  information  is 
mostly superior to that of outside investors, cf. Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). As the market 
is less well informed about the firm’s or the project’s quality, it may demand a premium on the 
capital provided that is equal to the premium charged to the median firm. This mechanism may lead 
to adverse selection among the firms applying for external financing. As a result, a relatively higher 
number of poorer quality firms may seek external financing as the relative cost of external funds 
(taking into account the project’s quality) is lower than for high quality firms. Moreover, a fraction of 
good investment projects which are not profitable enough to compensate for the excessively high cost 
of external financing (compared to the perfect information situation) are foregone. Thus, asymmetric 
information leads to hierarchy of financing sources (pecking order theory): good firms choose in the 
first instance internal financing, then debt (as the least informationally sensitive form of external 
                                                            
1 Asset substitution and debt overhang problems  - analyzed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), 
respectively - are associated with distortions in investment policy not related directly to conditions (i) and (ii) 
and, therefore, do not have a straightforward impact on the investment-cash flow sensitivity.   4 
financing), subsequently all kinds of hybrid debt with equity components, and finally external equity 
as a last resort. In this situation, asymmetric information leads to an underinvestment problem. A 
related problem of debt rationing is described by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Greenwald, Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1984). Here, the only way for the creditors to break even is to limit debt financing in 
order to balance the proportions of credit granted to risky and safe companies. As a result of such a 
credit  rationing,  some  positive  NPV  projects  are  not  undertaken  in  the  resulting  capital  market 
equilibrium. 
Another  source  of  the  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  is  the  agency  conflict  between 
shareholders  and  management  (Jensen,  1986,  2001;  Bernanke  and  Gertler,  1989;  Stulz,  1990). 
Corporate managers’ interests may not be perfectly aligned to the interests of shareholders as the 
utility managers derive from managing firms has been shown to be an increasing function of the 
corporations’ size. Many academic papers show that the pecuniary and non-pecuniary managerial 
benefits are higher in larger companies than in smaller ones (see e.g. Conyon, 1998; Conyon and 
Murphy, 2000; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2004). Therefore, management’s corporate objective 
may  be growth rather  than value. If this  is  the  case, the free cash flow hypothesis predicts that 
investment projects are undertaken as long as there is a free cash flow in the firm (which is - from the 
managerial view point - too inexpensive in relation to the true cost of capital). As a consequence, 
negative  net  present  value  investments  could  also  be  undertaken  resulting  in  overinvestment.  It 
should be noted that both asymmetric information and agency problems may result in a positive 
relationship between liquidity and investment.  
This  study  has  the  following  aims.  First,  we  investigate  whether  the widely-documented 
positive relation between corporate investment and liquidity (as demonstrated for the US in FHP, 
1988, see also a survey by Hubbard, 1999) is also present in the UK. We do so by estimating the 
standard reduced-form investment q-model, which controls for firms’ investment opportunities. 
Second, unlike most past investment research (cf. Vogt, 1994; Hadlock, 1998; Morgado and 
Pindado, 2003), we use multiple criteria to identify whether suboptimal investment is triggered by 
asymmetric information or it results from the agency cost of free cash flow. To achieve our objective, 
we  analyze  the  influence of ownership and control structures, growth opportunities and a firm’s   5 
technical  efficiency of deploying  its  assets  on  the  relationship between  the investment  level  and 
liquidity. More specifically, we focus on (i) the distribution of voting rights over different types of 
large shareholders, (ii) the interaction of the cash flow sensitivity and the firm’s growth opportunities 
under different ownership and control patterns and (iii) the impact of technical efficiency (calculated 
using the ‘optimal’ Tobin’s q – see infra) on this interaction. Our results provide strong support for 
the free cash flow theory as the main source of the observed investment-cash flow sensitivity. We 
also find some support for the asymmetric information hypothesis for a group of companies largely 
controlled by financial institutions. 
We test our hypotheses on a large sample of 985 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
over period 1992-98. This period is interesting for two reasons. First, it corresponds to an economic 
boom  period  during  which  liquidity  constraints  may  be  binding  for  expanding firms.  Second,  it 
embeds a period of improving corporate governance standards. Since July 1993, all listed firms are 
obliged to comply with the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee (published in December 
1992).
2  
Relatively  few  papers  test  the  investment-liquidity  relation  in  a  corporate  governance 
framework. Recent exceptions include Kathuria and Mueller (1995), Hadlock (1998), and Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003), for the US, Gugler (2003) for Austria, Haid and Weigand (2001) for Germany, 
Degryse and de Jong (2000) for the Netherlands, Pindado and de la Torre (2004) for Spain, and 
Goergen  and  Renneboog  (2001)  for  the  UK. This  paper contributes to  the existing  literature by 
distinguishing  between  investment  inefficiencies  induced  by  agency  cost  of  free  cash  flow  and 
asymmetric information using an extensive set of ownership variables. Furthermore, a large sample 
covering more than 85% of the market capitalization of UK industrial firms is explored. In addition, 
some techniques such as the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and the Shapley value methodology, 
are novel to or largely unexploited in the corporate investment research.  
                                                            
2  The  role  of  the  Cadbury  Committee  was  to  prevent  the  reoccurrence  of  spectacular  business  failures 
characteristic for the decade of the 1980s. The committee, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, was drawn from 
representatives from the top level of British industry, created a code of practice to assist UK corporations in 
defining and applying internal controls to limit their exposure to financial loss, from whatever cause. Whilst the 
recommendations themselves are not mandatory, all accounts of UK-listed companies must now clearly state 
whether  or  not  the  code  has  been  followed  and,  if  applicable,  the  reason  for  non-compliance  has  to  be 
presented. For details, see Cadbury Committee (1992).   6 
This paper presents some interesting findings. We find that the relationship between cash 
flow  sensitivity  and  insider  control  is  non-monotonic  and  reflects  the  interplay  of  managerial 
alignment of interests and entrenchment.
3 The interpretation of our results consistent with Jensen’s 
(1986) free cash flow theory indicates that at increasing share stakes managers’ interests become 
aligned with those of the shareholders and remain such for very high levels of insider ownership. At 
the same time, managerial entrenchment is likely to emerge at moderate to higher managerial equity 
stakes. Secondly, we find that the presence of large outside blockholders (and the related monitoring) 
mitigates the free cash flow problem.
 This is due to the blockholders’ incentive to monitor being 
positively related to their equity participation since the benefits of monitoring are proportional to the 
shareholding whereas the costs are independent from it and are borne by the shareholder in their 
entirety (cf. Grossman and Hart, 1980; Demsetz, 1983).  
Furthermore, we provide some support for the hypothesis that the presence of institutional 
blockholders facilitates the access to external financing, hence decreasing the reliance of a firm’s 
investments on internal cash flow (cf. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991).  
The use of the stochastic efficient frontier methodology to estimate a hypothetical ‘efficient 
q’, which the is the highest Tobin’s q a firm can achieve using its resources optimally, yields some 
interesting results. We assume that firms with low technical efficiency are poorly managed and that 
efficient  corporate  governance  is  lacking.  In  such  firms,  agency  problems  may  be  important.  In 
general, we find a negative relationship between the investment-cash flow sensitivity and corporate 
efficiency. This supports our earlier result that firms whose investment is sensitive to cash flow, 
suffer from agency problems, which is ultimately reflected in lower valuations. Finally, by analyzing 
firms pursuing different share repurchase and dividend policies, we provide evidence that observed 
cash flow sensitivity does reflect liquidity constraints.
4  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the relevant 
literature, while in Section 3, we formulate our hypotheses. Section 4 includes the description of the 
data set and methodology. In Section 5, we present our main results and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                            
3 As not only the impact of insider control in absolute numbers needs to be examined, we capture relative 
control exerted by insiders by calculating Shapley values.   7 
2.  Literature 
 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (hereafter FHP, 1988) open the debate on the impact of financing 
constraints  on  the  investment  level.
5  They  test  the  relationship  between  liquidity  and  capital 
expenditure for a sample of US manufacturing firms. The firms are classified into three categories 
based  on  the  long-term  dividend  ratio,  a  proxy  for  financing  constraints.  FHP  (1988)  regress 
investment on cash flow and Tobin’s q (the latter being a proxy for investment opportunities). The 
results show that the financial position in all the groups affects the firms’ investment level, but the 
sensitivity of capital expenditures with respect to cash flow fluctuations is the highest in a subsample 
of  low-dividend  firms.  Fazzari  and  Petersen  (1993)  provide  further  support  for  the  liquidity 
constraints hypothesis of FHP (1988) by analyzing the role of working capital as a use of funds. 
Their  study  concludes  that  the  investment  of  low-dividend  firms  appear  to  be  more  cash  flow 
sensitive and that working capital does seem to compete with fixed investment for funds.  
Carpenter  (1995)  is  one  of  the  first  authors  who  attempts  to  determine  why  liquidity 
constraints result in the cash flow sensitivity of investment. For a sample of big and mature low-q 
firms,  he  analyses  debt-for-equity  swaps,  which  can  be viewed  as  a way  to  improve managerial 
efficiency  by  reducing  free  cash  flow.  A  lower  dependence  of  investment  on  available  funds 
following the swap suggests the presence of overinvestment prior to the restructuring. Additional 
support for the free cash flow-based explanation is provided by Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick 
(1998),  who  use  the  sample  of  firms  from  6  OECD  countries.  Kadappakkam  et  al.  report  that 
investment of larger firms exhibits higher cash flow sensitivity. This is consistent with a view that 
managers of large firms that experience more serious agency problems of free cash flow, tend to 
expand the firm size whenever internal funds are available. 
In a paper on Japanese firms, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) extend the analysis by 
considering a corporate control framework, namely the firms’ relations with large banks belonging to 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
4 The assumption of liquidity constraints underlies both the free cash flow- and asymmetric information-based 
explanation of the positive relationship between cash flow and investment. 
5 A number of empirical contributions, though less directly related to our paper, are concerned with testing 
structural equations based on the Euler equations (cf. Abel, 1980; Bond and Meghir, 1994). In these models, 
the level of investment relative to the firm' s capital is then expressed as a function of discounted expected 
future investment adjusted for the impact of the expected changes in the input prices and net marginal output.   8 
large industrial groups (keiretsu). Keiretsu firms have closer ties to banks and hence easier access to 
external financing, which reduces liquidity constraints. Hoshi et al. confirm a lower investment-cash 
flow sensitivity of keiretsu members, which is in line with the asymmetric information hypothesis. 
Support for this hypothesis is also provided by Hadlock (1998), who studies the impact of insider 
shareholdings on the investment-cash flow sensitivity of US firms. The author finds an inverted U-
shaped relationship, which indicates that i) management’s participation in equity makes them more 
sensitive to the premium charged by the market on external financing, and that ii) entrenchment, 
which occurs at the higher ownership levels, reverses this relationship.   
Kaplan and Zingales (hereafter KZ, 1997) present a critique of FHP (1988) and of related 
articles,  which  claim  that  the  cash  flow  sensitivity  of  corporate  investment  reflects  financing 
constraints faced by the firm. Using the subsample of firms used by FHP (1988), KZ (1997) analyze 
both  quantitative  and  qualitative  information  on  firms  and  find  that  less  constrained  companies 
exhibit significantly higher cash flow sensitivity of investment. FHP (2000) respond by indicating a 
number of inconsistencies in the KZ (1997) approach, such as ignoring "firm' s incentives to maintain 
debt capacity and precautionary cash stocks that can be used to partially offset shocks to the flow of 
internal finance", using a small sample that is not sufficiently heterogeneous for drawing meaningful 
conclusions, and classifying firms with respect to the degree of financing constraints using fairly 
subjective set of criteria.  
Cleary  (1999)  contributes  to  the  FHP-KZ  debate  by  proxying  the  level  of  financing 
constraints with the firms’ creditworthiness measured by the Altman (1968) Z-score. He finds the 
highest investment-cash flow sensitivity for the subsample of non-constrained firms, which supports 
KZ  (1996).  More  recent  contributions,  such  as  Alti  (2003),  and  Gomes  (2001)  provide  mixed 
conclusions  about  the  role  of  financing  constraints  in  generating  high  investment-cash  flow 
sensitivities. Using a simulation approach, Moyen (2004) reconciles the results of FHP (1988) and 
KZ  (1997)  by  using  subsamples  without  and  with,  respectively,  a  priori  imposed  financial 
constraints.  Almeida  and  Campello  (2002)  obtain  that  credit-constrained  firms  exhibit  higher 
sensitivity than those with free access to capital markets. Using the real options framework, Boyle   9 
and Guthrie (2003) show that relatively unconstrained firms do overinvest, however, the magnitude 
of overinvestment in those firms is positively related to the degree of financing constraints.  
To summarize, the existing literature confirms the existence of the positive investment-cash 
flow sensitivity, identifies that it can be based on the agency cost of free cash flow and/or asymmetric 
information, but fails to resolve under which circumstances it is related to the liquidity constraints. 
Since  both  agency  theoretical  and  asymmetric  information-based  explanations  of  the  cash  flow 
sensitivity of investment rely on the assumption of a costly access to external capital, a properly 
designed  empirical  attempt  to  disentangle  those  two  hypotheses  should  also  verify  that  liquidity 
constraints are a driving force of the sensitivity observed in the sample. 
 
3.  Hypotheses 
 
3.1.  Agency cost of free cash flow 
High free cash flows may tempt management to pursue an ‘empire building’-strategy (Grossman and 
Hart, 1982) and, hence, to overinvest (Jensen, 1986). The reason for this agency problem is that 
management not only receives a higher remuneration in larger firms (Conyon and Murphy, 2000), 
but that management may also be able to extract private benefits of control (which may be non-
pecuniary, like prestige) from managing larger firms (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Thus, a high amount 
of corporate liquidity may encourage growth-maximizing management to pursue investment projects 
with an expected rate of return below the hurdle rate. In other words, internal financing is sufficiently 
inexpensive from the managerial viewpoint so that even negative NPV, scale-increasing projects are 
undertaken. This free cash flow-agency problem reflected in a positive relation between cash flow 
and investment is expected to be more substantial in widely-held companies with low managerial 
ownership.  The  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  is  likely  to  initially  decrease  with  increasing 
managerial ownership as co-ownership is expected to turn the management’s focus to shareholder 
value maximization. This is due to the fact that alignment of interests will prevent management from 
squandering  extra  cash  flow  on  unprofitable  projects.  Hence,  we  expect  an  initially  negative   10 
relationship  between  the  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  and  insider  ownership  due  to  better 
alignment of interests and lower agency costs (Hypothesis 1a). 
The investment-cash flow sensitivity is not expected to decrease monotonically with rising 
insider control. At higher levels of managerial ownership, a second type of agency problem may 
arise: entrenched managers may expropriate the rights of minority shareholders (for examples see 
Johnson  et  al.,  2000)  and  pursue  too  aggressive  an  investment  policy.  This  may  result  in  the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity increasing for moderate to high levels of managerial ownership. 
(Likewise, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) show that insider 
ownership has a non-linear impact on firm value.) Finally, if the managerial ownership becomes 
sufficiently high, that is, when management internalizes a large fraction of the changes in the firm’s 
value resulting from suboptimal investments, the investment-cash flow sensitivity will decrease (cf. 
Morck et al., 1988). Hence, we expect an S-shaped relationship between the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity and insider ownership due to the magnitude of the agency cost of free cash flow changing 
with insider ownership (Hypothesis 1b). 
Corporate  monitoring  by  large  outside  shareholders  and  by  non-executive  directors  is 
expected to attenuate the agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The costs of free 
cash  flow  may  be  reduced  when  shareholders  perform  an  active  monitoring  role  (Lai  and 
Sudarsanam,  1997;  Lasfer,  1995).  Existing  empirical  evidence  for  the  UK  shows  that  industrial 
corporations as well as individuals (not related to the firm’s top management) owning large share 
blocks discipline incumbent management in the wake of a performance decline and in the absence of 
managerial entrenchment (see Franks, Mayer and Renneboog, 2001). Since a shareholder internalizes 
the  entire  cost  related  to  her  control  efforts  but  benefits  only  in  proportion  to  her  share  stake 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980; Demsetz, 1983), monitoring will only be cost effective if this shareholder 
(or  a  coalition  of  shareholders)  becomes  sufficiently  large.
6  Hence,  we  expect  that  blockholder 
monitoring reduces agency costs and hence the investment-cash flow sensitivity (Hypothesis 1c). 
                                                            
6 Beyond a certain ownership level another problem may occur: the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
large  blockholders  more  severe  conflict  between  majority  and  minority  shareholders  (Shleifer  and  Vishny, 
1997; Johnson et al., 2000.)    11 
The agency-related overinvestment problem is more serious in mature firms with low growth 
perspectives (Jensen, 1986; Carpenter, 1995). Those low-q firms suffer from a shortage of positive 
NPV  projects.  As  a  result,  it  may  be  that  extra  cash  flow  generated  may  be  squandered  by  its 
managers  on  value-destroying  projects  (see  Vogt,  1994).  In  other  words,  for  low-q  firms,  the 
availability of additional cash flow may be associated with excess investment spending. Hence, we 
expect a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for low-q firms (Hypothesis 1d). 
If  managers run companies  efficiently, they do not exhibit empire-building behavior and 
their investment policies are not related to the internally generated cash flow. Consequently, in firms 
where the observed Tobin’s q is close to the efficient q, the investment policy should not be sensitive 
to  liquidity.  High  efficiency  means  that  the  firm  resources  are  not  wasted  by  overspending 
management. One should be able to observe this most clearly in the low-q firms, which are more 
prone  to  the  free  cash  flow  problem.  Hence,  we  expect  a  negative  relation  between  cash  flow 
sensitivity and technical efficiency for low-q firms, which reflects the diminishing agency costs of free 
cash flow (Hypothesis 1e). 
 
3.2.  Asymmetric Information 
A shortage of internally generated funds will lead to corporate underinvestment due to asymmetric 
information (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This occurs when a firm faces insufficient funds to finance an 
investment  project  and  when  the  financial  markets  to  which  the  management  turns  to  attract 
additional funds, have less information about the true NPV of the project. Even for high quality 
projects, the less-informed financial markets demand a risk premium that reflects average project 
quality. This risk premium may be deemed excessively high for some projects that actually do pass 
the management’s hurdle rate which correctly reflects the project’s risk. Similarly, in the presence of 
informational asymmetries the firm may face credit rationing in the debt markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). Consequently,  management  may  be forced  to  pass over some positive NPV projects as a 
consequence  of  asymmetric  information.  This  underinvestment  problem  is  expected  to  be  more 
important  when  the  management  of  an  otherwise  widely-held  firm  controls  a  large  equity  stake 
(Hadlock, 1998). The positive relationship between cash flow and corporate investment induced by   12 
asymmetric  information  will  decrease  with  falling  levels  of  insider  ownership.  When  the 
management  owns  only  a  small  stake  in  a  widely  held  firm,  it  may  accept  the  (excessive)  risk 
premium of the financial markets and knowingly invest in, effectively, negative NPV projects (see 
Hadlock, 1998). Hence, we expect an initially positive relationship between investment-cash flow 
sensitivity and insider ownership due to management internalizing a higher fraction of the premium 
on external capital (Hypothesis 2a). 
The underinvestment problem described in Hypothesis 2a will be attenuated if a block of the 
firm’s  shares  is  held  by  a  financial  institution.  Kahn  and  Winton  (1998)  argue  that  the  large 
blockholding of a financial institution reduces the informational asymmetry between the institution 
and the firm. Combined with the result of Shleifer and Vishny (1986), who state that a shareholder 
has an incentive to gather information about the firm if their stake is sufficiently large, blockholding 
by financial institutions is expected to reduce informational asymmetries between the firm and the 
capital market due to institutions’ expertise and active capital market participation. In such a case, the 
firm could rely more heavily on external sources of financing, of which cost will be closer to the 
firm’s true cost of capital (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991). Consequently, we hypothesize 
that  the  presence  of  a  financial  institution  reduces  the  asymmetric  information  problem, 
underinvestment, and the resulting investment-cash flow sensitivity. Hence, we expect a negative 
relationship between institutional blockholding and investment-cash flow sensitivity (Hypothesis 2b). 
When liquidity constraints are present, the underinvestment problem is expected to be more 
outspoken  for  high  growth  companies  (with  high  Tobin’s  q).  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
informational asymmetry is more severe when a large proportion of the firm’s value can be attributed 
to growth opportunities of which the quality is to a large extent unverifiable ex ante (cf. Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). Furthermore, a closely related argument is that the relative amount of collateral that 
those companies are able to pledge is limited (cf. Almeida and Campello, 2004). This makes the cost 
of external financing higher, which, in turn, results in a stronger relationship between the internally 
generated cash flow and investment. Hence, we expect a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity of 
high-q firms (Hypothesis 2c).   13 
Finally, while high-q firms are in general more prone to asymmetric information problems, 
the  problem  of  asymmetric  information  and  the  resulting  high  risk  premium  which  causes  the 
underinvestment problem, may be reduced in firms with investment opportunities recognized by the 
market. If corporate efficiency is somehow observed by the market (i.e. Tobin’s q is close to the 
efficient q), we should observe a negative relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and 
technical efficiency as measured by the ratio of Tobin’s q to efficient q. Hence, we expect a negative 
relation between cash flow sensitivity and technical efficiency for high-q firms, reflecting diminishing 
informational asymmetry (Hypothesis 2d). 
The possible reasons for the observed investment cash-flow sensitivity – the agency cost of 
free cash flow and asymmetric information – are difficult to disentangle as both result in a positive 
sign of the relationship. Still, by analyzing the investment-cash flow sensitivity across samples with 
(i) different levels of insider ownership, (ii) different levels of outside block ownership, (iii) varying 
magnitudes of the monitoring activity of financial institutions, proxied by their block ownership, and 
(iv) changing levels of firms’ efficiency (as measured by the degree to which the use of assets in 
place are efficiently translated in growth opportunities), one can determine the dominant reason of 
the observed relationship. 
In the case of the agency cost of free cash flow, we expect to see high cash flow sensitivity at 
low  levels  of  insider  ownership,  a  reduction  of  this  sensitivity  at  its  rising  levels,  a  subsequent 
increase at moderate levels of insider control, and a futher decline at its high stakes (Morck et al., 
1988). Furthermore, the magnitude of overinvestment is likely to be initially reduced by enhanced 
monitoring by industrial corporations, and by individuals (not related to a director) or families.
7 
Finally, agency costs may be lower in more efficient firms (with q’s closer to their efficient q’s) even 
if these firms have a low Tobin’s q. We expect there to be a negative or insignificant relation cash 
flow sensitivity in such firms due to smaller agency problems  
If asymmetric information is the main source of the observed suboptimal investment, we 
expect cash flow sensitivity to be strongest at low to moderate and very high levels of managerial 
                                                            
 
7 We use the UK definition of a director: a director is a person serving on the board of directors and can have an 
executive or non-executive position.    14 
ownership. Moreover, we hypothesize a negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
cash  flow  sensitivity  due  to  financial  institutions  collecting  information  on  the  quality  of 
management and their investment projects. Furthermore, if corporate efficiency is recognized by the 
market (which is captured by the firm’s Tobin’s q being close to its efficient q), the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity will be lower.  
 
3.3.  Financing constraints 
Since both the free cash flow theory and asymmetric information hypothesis rely on the assumption 
that the (pre-contractual) cost of external financing exceeds the cost of internally generated funds, we 
test whether the observed relationship can be attributed to liquidity constraints. Firms that are the 
most likely candidates as being liquidity constrained are those firms that reduce dividends or refrain 
from repurchasing their shares (cf. FHP, 1988; Goergen and Renneboog, 2001; Correia da Silva et al. 
2004). Evidence of a significantly higher cash flow sensitivity for liquidity constrained firms would 
support the hypothesis that the sensitivity is generated by a need of funds, and not other factors, such 
as cash flow proxying for investment opportunities failed to be captured by market-to-book value 
ratio, or the capital structure adjustments (Moyen, 2004). Hence, we expect a negative relationship 
between dividend increases/share repurchases and investment-cash flow sensitivity (Hypothesis 3). 
 
4.  Data and methodology 
 
4.1.  Data sources and variable description 
Of all the firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, we exclude banks, insurance companies, and 
other financial firms as the type of corporate investments and accounting data differ from those of 
industrial and commercial firms. We also exclude utilities of which the investment behavior and 
access to external financing is regulated. We also only retain firms for which we have ownership data 
were available in the Worldscope Disclosure data set over the period 1992-1998. Our sample consists 
of  985  UK  firms  listed  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange  and  includes  206  agricultural,  mining,   15 
forestry, fishing and construction firms (SIC codes 1-1999), 407 manufacturing firms (SIC codes 
2000-3999), 204 retail and wholesale firms (SIC codes 5000-5999) and 168 service firms (SIC codes 
7000-8999). 
   Descriptive statistics of the data are included in Table 1 (currency denominated items are in 
GBP ‘000s). The average and median investment of our sample firms amount to, respectively, 9.7% 
and 4.4% of the capital stock while the median cash flow standardized by capital is 42%. Average 
leverage  is  almost  40%.  The  median current ratio is about 1.4 and the median firm manages to 
service its debt well as the median interest coverage amounts to 5.3. Our proxy for Tobin’s q, market-
to-book value of assets averages 1.87 with a median of 1.45. The optimally attainable or efficient q is 
higher with an average of 3.61 and a median of 1.67 (for the calculation methodology, see infra). The 
median  return  on  equity  is  12.9%  whereas  the  median  operating  margin  amounts  to  7.1%.  UK 
companies pay out about 20% of earnings in dividends. On average, dividends increase by 47% over 
the sample period of 1992-98 (with a median of 9.2%), 70.1% of firms increase dividends, whereas 
16.2% of firms do not change dividends. 5.8% of our sample repurchased equity, but the average 
percentage of equity bought back remained very small at 8.3% of equity. New equity issues using 
rights or open offers were undertaken by 52.1% of firms with an average of 10.8% of equity capital. 
The variables used in the regression analysis are defined as in the Worldscope database unless stated 
otherwise. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows the evolution of investment levels over the sample period. Both the median 
and  mean  levels  fluctuate  over  time.  As  of  1995,  a  buoyant  economy  is  further  stimulated  by 
increasing investments, which median level amounts to GBP 0.96 million.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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The  ownership  data,  including  the  name  and  the  percentage  of  shares  held  by  a  given 
shareholder  are  collected  from  Worldscope.  We  categorized  ownership  stakes  by  class  of 
shareholder: (i) institutional investors consisting of banks, investment and pension funds, insurance 
companies,  and  real  estate  firms;  (ii)  industrial  and  commercial  companies;  (iii)  individuals  and 
families not related to a director; (iv) government; and (v) insiders consisting of: the CEO and his 
family,  the  chairman  and  his  family,  executive  directors  (excluding  CEO  and  chair)  and  their 
families, and non-executive directors (excluding the chair) and their families. To distinguish between 
more  than  5000  insider  and  outsider  individual  shareholders,  we  consulted  the  London  Stock 
Exchange Monitor and the Who’s Who-guides. To identify institutional shareholders, we consulted 
Datastream, Institutional Investors Annual Guides and the world wide web.  
The largest owner in the median UK firm owns about 15.5% (with a mean of about 21%, see 
panel A of Table 3). Accumulating all large shareholders who own share stakes of at least 5%, we 
find that the average shareholder coalition controls almost 40% of the voting rights. Panel B also 
shows  that  there is little  variability  in  accumulated ownership across time. The low median and 
average Herfindahl index of Panel C shows that control is not concentrated in the hands of one or two 
large shareholders but that equity stakes are held by about six large shareholders in most firms.  
 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 gives a detailed analysis of ownership by type of owner. Financial institutions are clearly the 
strongest shareholder class: they are present in most UK firms but their individual stakes are usually 
smaller than 10%. Corporations control the largest equity stake in only 10% of listed UK firms, but 
when they do this shareholding is large (about 30%). Likewise, families and individuals (not related 
to a director) own share stakes in a minority of sample firms but usually have a large control stake. 
Since the privatizations of the 1980s, the government only rarely holds a (small) equity stake in listed 
firms. An important shareholder class comprises inside  shareholders, consisting  of the CEO, the 
chairman, executive and non-executive directors. Their large equity stake is partly explained by the 
fact that yearly a number of firms are floated on the stock exchange, amounting to 4% of all listed   17 
companies.  At  floatation,  the  initial  (pre-IPO)  shareholders  retain  an  average  accumulated 
shareholding of 62% (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001), which is gradually diluted over time.  
The one-share-one-vote principle is upheld in listed UK companies as there are no dual class 
voting shares and as regulation has impeded cascade ownership structures. Still, the percentage of 
ownership does not necessarily reflect the degree of control as 50% of equity plus 1 vote yields 
absolute control. Given that most UK companies are characterized by diffuse ownership structures, a 
measure needs to be used which captures the true degree of shareholder control. Therefore, we resort 
to Shapley (1953) values (SVs), which assign a power index to each shareholder that reflects their 
relative importance in forming winning voting coalitions.  
The Shapley value is a way to distribute the total surplus from cooperation to blockholders, 
assuming that they all collaborate. The amount that blockholder i receives if the value function v is 
being used is given by 





- È - - =
N S i




In Eq. (1), n is the number of blockholders and the sum extends over all subsets S of the grand 
coalition N not containing blockholder i. Eq. (1) implies that the compensation of blockholder i is 
proportional to their contribution v(S È{i}) − v(S) scaled with all the possible different combinations 
of N in which a coalition can be formed. 
Shapley  and  Shubik  (1954)  introduce  the  concept  of  ‘P-power’  which  posits  an  office-
seeking  motivation  of  voting  behavior  and  which  is  reflected  in  the  Shapley  values.  If  a  given 
blockholder coalition wins, it gains collective possession of a fixed amount of transferable utility and 
each of the winning votes receive a non-negative payoff, all adding up to the total prize, which we 
normalize to 1. The remaining blockholders get zero as a pay off (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998). 
Consequently, v(S) = 1 if the coalition S represents more than 50% of votes and v(S) = 0 otherwise. 
In the context of this study, the winning coalition influences the investment decision. As differential 
voting behavior is motivated by different conceptions of future performance and private benefits 
under  the  incumbent  management,  the  resisting  blockholders  (among  which  the  equity  owning 
incumbent  management)  are  expected  will  suffer  a  reduction  in  financial  returns  and  private   18 
benefits.
8,9  
Table 4 (Panels D and E) shows the Shapley value of the largest shareholder by category of 
owner and the relative voting power (SV) of a shareholder category. Note that SVs are not additive, 
but by calculating the SV of a shareholder category we assume that the shareholders of specific 
categories are more prone to collaborate and to vote together (Crespi and Renneboog, 2002). In other 
words, in this case we assume that each category (e.g. the executive directors) vote together. In such 
a two-stage game, the relative voting power of categories (here considered as ex ante coalitions) can 
be calculated. The average SV of the financial institutions is high: 0.566 (i.e. a financial institution 
participating  in  the  wining  coalition  would  receive  slightly  above  the  half  of  the  surplus  from 
cooperation). The second most important shareholder class in terms of relative voting power is that of 
the  insider  shareholders.  Table  4  also  shows  that  the  SVs  of  the  largest  shareholders  relatively 
quickly converge to 1.  
 
4.2.  Methodology 
4.2.1. Panel data methodology 
Since our data set contains both cross-sectional and time-series observations, we apply a panel data 
methodology. We estimate the random-effects model (EGLS) that gives the most efficient parameter 
estimates  (Greene,  2002).  Since  the  EGLS  estimator  requires  for  consistency  that  the  vector  of 
explanatory variables be uncorrelated with the error term, we use Hausman (1978) test to verify the 
                                                            
8 Felsenthal and Machover (1998) also discuss several alternative power indices like the Deegan-Packel index 
and the Johnston index but illustrate the ”extremely counter-intuitive ‘pathological’ behavior of these indices” 
(p. 211).  
9 A problem in calculating the relative shareholder power is induced by the fact that the owners of a substantial 
proportion of the equity capital (on average about 60%) are unknown. These anonymous shareholders do not 
have to comply to the disclosure regulation because their share stakes do not exceed the notification threshold 
of 3%. Although assumptions on potential coalition formation and voting behavior could be quantified for this 
‘ocean’ of atomistic shareholders, we assume that they do not participate in voting coalitions (to discipline 
management) as it is in practice difficult to organize minuscule share stakes into voting blocks (Chung and 
Kim, 1999). During protracted hostile take-over battles, coalitions of large shareholders may solicit votes of 
atomistic shareholders to buttress a coalition, but influencing corporate investment policy seems to be more the 
competence  of  large  shareholders  due  to  free  riding  behavior  of  small  shareholders.  Therefore,  prior  to 
calculating the SVs, rescaling the sum of the large share blocks to 100% is a fair assumption. The resulting SVs 
reflect the relative voting power whereby a winning coalition is expected to reach absolute control (50%+1 of 
the rescaled vote).   19 
null hypothesis that this correlation equals zero. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we use a less 
efficient but consistent fixed-effects estimator. In each case, we report which estimator is used.  
 
4.2.2. Stochastic efficient frontier methodology 
We  use  the  stochastic  frontier  model  to  obtain  a  theoretical  measure  for  Tobin’s  q  under  the 
assumption that a firm utilizes the optimal combination of its inputs. To obtain efficiency estimates 
we apply package FRONTIER 4.1 written by Tim Coelli (see Coelli, 1996). Our approach is similar 
to  Habib  and  Ljungqvist  (2005),  who  calculate  the  difference  between  efficient  and  actual  q  to 
measure  the  extent  to  which  agency  problems  prevail  in  the  analyzed  companies.  We  apply  the 
Battese and Coelli (1995) model, which assumes that that part of the error term which reflects poor 
management is drawn from a truncated normal distribution. The way we model the efficient q differs 
from  the  approach  of  Habib  and  Ljungqvist  (2005)  with  respect  to  the  choice  of  the  set  of 
explanatory variables.  
The stochastic frontier model we estimate is 
MVt/BVt = b0 + b1 lnSalest + b2 (lnSalest)
2 + b3 It/Kt-1 + b4 Kt-1/Salest 
 +b5 OperMart +b5 LEVt – vt + et,          (2) 
where  MVt/BVt  is  the  market-to-book  ratio,  lnSalest  is  the  natural  logarithm of revenues,   It/Kt-1 
represents the investment-to-capital ratio, Kt-1/Salest is the capital intensity, OperMart is the operating 
margin, and LEVt denotes market leverage. To prevent the loss of information when there is missing 
data in any firm-year, we set the value of the missing observation to zero and set the value of the 
related dummy variable to one. In Eq. (2), et is a random error distributed according to N(0, ￿e
2) and 
vt is a non-negative random component that reflects the inefficiencies in operating the company by 
the management. The random component vit is distributed according to N(Ztm, ￿v
2), where Zt denotes 
the vector of variables affecting the inefficiency level of a given firm, and m is a vector of unknown 
parameters. In our case, the inefficiency contribution vt is estimated as 
vt = a0 + a1 INSt + a2 (INSt)
2 + a3 Blockt + a4 (Blockt)
2 + ut.      (3)   20 
INSt  is  the  insiders’  share  of  stock,  and  Blockt  denotes  the  other  blockholders’  (not  insiders) 
ownership. 
Equations  (2)  and  (3)  are  estimated  in  the  following  three  steps:  (i)  running  an  OLS 
regression in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the vector of parameters of (2), (ii) applying a 
grid search procedure determining the fraction of ￿v
2/(￿e
2+ ￿v
2) corresponding to the best fit of the 
OLS model, and (iii) performing an iterative procedure leading to the final joint maximum likelihood 
estimation of (2) and (3). 
Applying  the  stochastic  frontier  methodology  to  MVt/BVt  leads  to  the  estimate  of  the 
difference between the stock market valuation and the hypothetical value of a firm if its assets are put 
to  the  best  possible  use.  The  parameter  estimates  and  their  t-statistics,  are  presented  in  Table  5 
(Panels A and B). The signs of the coefficients of the stochastic frontier seem to be plausible. The 
positive  impact  of  capital  expenditure,  and  the  negative  impact  of  capital  intensity  and  market 
leverage on the firm’s value are consistent with Habib and Ljungqvist (2005). 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
  
  The estimated coefficients in the inefficiency model are also of interest. The coefficient of 
INSt is positive, which indicates that the firms subject to managerial entrenchment are on average less 
efficient. However, at high levels of ownership the presence of other blockholder may exacerbate this 
problem.  Despite  the  fact  that  both  variables  taken  in  isolation  are  on  the  brink  of  statistical 
significance,  the  likelihood  ratio  (LR)  test  indicates  the  significance  of  the  set  of  explanatory 
variables of the one side-error component (which is equivalent to rejecting null hypothesis that ak = 0 
"kÎ{0,1,2,3,4}). 
  The average level of efficiency, denoted by EFFt and obtained by estimating model (2)-(3), 
equals 0.846.
10 This implies that the market value of an average firm could be increased by 18.2% 
((1-0.846)/  0.846)  if  all  its  resources  were  used  efficiently.  In  absolute  terms  this  percentage 
                                                            
10 Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) report the average efficiency of the 1992-1997 sample of 1487 US firms to be 
equal to 0.907.   21 
correspond to the difference in value of GBP 99.04 million. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 5 (Panel C). Equipped with an estimate of technical inefficiency for every firm, we introduce a 
new measure, efficient q, defined as Q
eff
t º MVt/BVt * (EFFt)
-1.   
The technical efficiency parameter allows us to predict the degree to which firms suffer from 
the agency costs of free cash flow and the high premium for external financing, which makes them 
unable to utilize their resources fully efficiently. To do so, we estimate the cash flow-investment 
models  after  categorizing  the  firms  according  into  the  low-q  firms  (where  agency  problems  are 
expected  to be  more  prominent)  and high-q  firms (in  which  asymmetric information may create 
underinvestment), and including interaction term CFt/Kt-1*EFFt.  
 
4.  Results 
 
The estimation results of the basic investment model It/Kt-1 = b0 + b1 CFt/Kt-1 + b2 MVt-1/BVt-1 + et for 
all 3445 firm-years are presented in Table 6.
11 We observe a significantly positive relationship (at the 
1% level) between corporate investment and cash flow (see Panel A) after controlling for the firms'  
investment opportunities captured by Tobin’s q (proxied by the beginning-of-the-period market-to-
book value ratio). The positive cash flow sensitivity may result from an overinvestment problem 
(related to the agency cost of free cash flow) or an underinvestment problem (as a consequence of 
asymmetric information). If agency problems are the predominant reason, we expect the cash flow 
sensitivity to be higher in the subsample of low insider ownership. With rising levels of managerial 
ownership, we expect the correlation to decrease because management will be more focused on value 
creation. If in contrast, asymmetric information is a serious problem, we expect a high cash flow 
sensitivity at higher levels of insider ownership. In this case, management will be reluctant to attract 
external funding for high quality projects when this quality is not recognized by the market. The 
resulting underinvestment will decrease with falling levels of insider ownership.  
Subsequently, we analyze how the investment-cash flow sensitivity changes between firms 
with insider ownership above the median and below median and between firms with high versus low 
                                                            
11 For the sake of transparency, we suppress the cross-section subscript i.    22 
outside block ownership. The interaction dummies of Panel B of Table 6 test for the difference in 
coefficients across the different subsamples. In the case of weak insider control in widely-held firms 
(with no blockholder monitoring) the cash flow sensitivity is relatively high and equals 0.096. When 
insiders own large share blocks, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is much smaller and amounts to 
0.096 - 0.035 = 0.061 (panel B). This corroborates the free cash flow Hypothesis 1a: investment is 
less dependent on cash flow when management participates in the equity and is thus more focused on 
value  creation.  At  the  same time,  these  findings do not support Hypothesis 2a which states that 
increasing  insider  ownership  induces  a  positive  relation  between  investment  and  cash  flow.  The 
reason  is  that  management  may  pass  over  some  positive  investment  projects  as  their  equity 
ownership makes them internalize a higher fraction of the premium on external capital which may be 
too high due to asymmetric information between the external capital markets and the management. 
The model of panel B also allows us to investigate the impact of large blockholders on a 
firm’s investment decision. In firms with strong blockholders but low insider ownership, the cash 
flow  coefficient  goes  down  substantially  to  0.048  (0.096-0.048).  This  shows  that  even  when 
management does not hold any equity stakes, liquidity-dependent investment will be reduced as a 
result  of  reduced  agency  costs  due  to  increased  blockholder  monitoring.  This  strongly  supports 
Hypothesis 1c. Finally, taking into account all interaction dummies (this corresponds to high levels of 
managerial  and  outside  shareholdings)  shows  that  both  types  of  ownership  act  as  substitutes  in 
reducing the investment-cash flow sensitivity. Consequently, the sensitivity in this group equals to 
0.065 and is lower than of widely-held firms but does not seem to be a further improvement beyond 
what is obtained when a single type of blockholdings is present. To summarize, the results presented 
in Table 6 support the hypothesis that the observed investment-cash flow sensitivity is driven by 
Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment problem. 
 
 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Hypothesis 1b states that the relation between cash flow sensitivity and insider ownership is 
non-monotonic (S-shaped) due to a change in magnitude of the interests’ alignment of management   23 
and  shareholders  and  due  to  the  possible  emergence  of  managerial  entrenchment.  To  test  this 
hypothesis,  we  first  estimate  an  investment  model  which  includes  interactive  terms  of  (insider) 
ownership and cash flow.
12 The cubic form of the model for insider ownership is designed to provide 
sufficient  flexibility  to  capture  the  hypothesized  S-shaped  cash  flow  sensitivity-ownership 
relationship (Hypothesis 1b). The quadratic form of the model for other types of blockholdings is 
flexible enough to detect potential expropriation effects at the high ownership levels (Shleifer and 
Vishny,  1997;  Johnson  et  al.,  2000).  Panel  A  of  Table  7  shows  the  results  of  this  model.  The 
estimated coefficients indicate a non-monotonic between insider ownership and investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, consistent with McConnell and Servaes (1990). However, only the linear term in on the 
brink of statistical significance, whereas the quadratic and cubic terms do not significantly differ 
from zero. Therefore, the results of the model provide weak support for Hypothesis 1a.  
One of the reasons for the weak performance of the cubic regression is that it implicitly relies 
on the assumption that observations are uniformly distributed across the domain of the explanatory 
variable. Consequently, when many observations are clustered over a small interval of ownership 
levels, this interval would have a disproportionately high weight in determining the curvature of the 
ownership-sensitivity  relationship.  As  a  consequence,  other  regions  of  ownership  (those  with  a 
relatively smaller number of observations) will be given a smaller weight, which can distort the 
curvature and result in the estimated equation failing to pick up the true relationship. 
Given that the distribution of ownership levels is highly skewed (cf. Table 4, Panel B), we 
also  estimate  a  piecewise  linear  regression model that relates investment-cash flow sensitivity to 
insider ownership. The choice of the cut-off points in the estimated piecewise linear equation is based 
                                                            
 
12 In general, it is possible to determine first the regions of interest alignment/entrenchment (in case of insiders) 
and of monitoring (for other types of blockholders) by regressing the firm’s value on the ownership variables 
(and finding the cutoff points by calculating the local extrema of the polynomial functions). Subsequently, one 
can  use  these  regions  in  the  investment  equation  (see  e.g.  Morgado  and  Pindado,  2003).  An  alternative 
approach is to directly regress investment on cash flow and interaction dummies with cash flow and ownership 
variables and to interpret the results as (in)consistent with alignment/entrenchment and monitoring hypotheses 
(see Hadlock, 1998, for some theoretical motivation). We adopt the latter approach since it does not rely on the 
assumption  that  ownership  affects  the  value  of  the  firm  only  via  alignment/entrenchment  (for  insider 
ownership) and monitoring (for block ownership). In fact, such an assumption is likely to be violated due to a 
number of other factors that result in the change of the firm value as (insider) ownership rises: higher takeover 
premia (Burkart, 1995), reduced market liquidity (Holmström and Tirole, 1993), lower diversification benefits 
(Demsetz  and  Lehn,  1983),  changes  in  productivity  (Köke  and  Renneboog,  2004)  and  reduced  managerial 
initiative (Burkart et al., 1997).    24 
on a grid search technique (we elect the specification with the highest goodness-of-fit). We obtain 
cut-off points of 16% and 22% (see Panel B of Table 7).
13 The piecewise linear model is sufficiently 
flexible  to  capture  the  changes  in  the  slopes  of  the  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  for  weak, 
medium and strong insider ownership. The results of the model are as follows. When the levels of 
managerial ownership increase in the range [0-16%), the sensitivity decreases by on average 0.005 
for every additional percent of managerial ownership. This reduction is undone due to an increase in 
suboptimal investing when insider control increases further (within the range [16-22%]). This implies 
that overinvestment problems are exacerbated by managerial entrenchment. The change in signs are 
in line with Hypothesis 1b which states that cash flow sensitivity initially decreases with rising levels 
of insider ownership, but that entrenchment may lead to more suboptimal investment decisions for 
moderate insider ownership levels. At very high insider control levels of 22% or more (which is 
substantially above the median of the largest share stake, which equals 15%), the negative impact of 
entrenchment  disappears  and  investment  decisions  become  again  less  dependent  on  the  firm’s 
liquidity. The fact that the cash flow sensitivity of investment initially decreases with rising insider 
ownership and subsequently increases, is consistent with the alignment/entrenchment hypotheses on 
insiders formulated by Morck, et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) in the context of 
corporate valuation. The reduction in the sensitivity beyond 22% is consistent with Morck, et al., 
1988),  as  it  reflects  further  alignment  of  managerial  interests  beginning  to  exceed  existing 
entrenchment effects. The results of the regression model of Panel B support Hypothesis 1b that the 
agency costs of free cash flow result in an S-shaped relationship between insider ownership and 
investment-cash  flow  sensitivity.  A  negative  sign  of  the  block  ownership  interaction  term  is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1c that the presence of outside blockholders attenuates the agency cost of 
free cash flow. 
Panel  C  of  Table  7  also  investigates  the  impact  of  outside  blockholders  on  the  non-
monotonic relation. When outside blockholders do not own large equity stakes (their ownership is 
below  the  median),  the  non-monotonic  relation is conserved:  (i) there  is  a  decreasing  cash flow 
                                                            
 
13 In the UK literature, we find that the following cut off points are chosen: 14% and 42% in Short and Keasey 
(1999), 13% and 30% in Mudambi and Nicosia (1998), and 20% and 54% in Faccio and Lasfer (1999).    25 
sensitivity at low levels of managerial ownership, (ii) cash flow sensitivity is substantially amplified 
when insider ownership rises further above 16%, and (iii) cash flow sensitivity begins to decrease 
again when insiders’ ownership is close to a blocking minority. The presence of large equity stakes 
owned by outsiders has three effects. First, it reduces the cash flow sensitivity in firms with no 
managerial ownership and in firms with high levels (more than 22%). Second, it exacerbates the 
investment cash flow sensitivity in the region of managerial entrenchment (between 16% and 22%), 
which may indicate either that large outside blockholders are not able to curb managerial suboptimal 
investing  or  that  they  somehow  extract  private  benefits  of  control  at  the  expense  of  minority 
shareholders. Third, the presence of blockholders reduces the negative impact of insider ownership 
on the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flow for low levels of insider control. 
The latter result suggests that inside and outside ownership act in the relevant interval as substitutes 
in reducing the agency costs of free cash flow. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Panels A and B of Table 7 confirm that the presence of major outside shareholders reduces 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity. As different types of outside blockholders may have different 
abilities and incentives to monitor management and influence the firm’s investment decisions, Table 
8  shows  the  impact  on  the  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  of  insiders,  institutions  (banks, 
investment and pension funds, insurance companies, real estate firms), industrial and commercial 
companies,  non-executive directors,  the  government and other blockholders (mainly families and 
individuals  not  related  to  a  director).
14  The  table  enables  us  to  draw the  following conclusions. 
Firstly,  the  non-monotonic  relationship  between  insider  ownership  and  cash  flow  sensitivity  is 
confirmed. In other words, we still observe the effects of a growing alignment of managerial interests 
with those of shareholders at a low ownership level, entrenchment at its moderate level, and a further 
                                                            
 
14  The  chosen  25%  threshold,  which  allows  for  changing  slope  of  the  cash  flow  sensitivity-ownership 
relationship  for  outside  blockholders,  represents  a  blocking  minority.  A  shareholder  controlling  a  blocking 
minority has an important say (holds a veto right) on changes in the acts of incorporation, changes in the voting 
rights composition etc.    26 
alignment  at  high  stakes.  Secondly,  we  show  that  blockholdings  (by  the  government,  financial 
institutions, and of more than 25% by industrial and commercial companies) attenuate the agency 
costs of free cash flow, which results in a lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. Surprisingly, non-
executive directors owning substantial share stakes do not seem to influence the investment decision. 
If they were monitoring management dutifully, the fact that the corporate investment policy depends 
on  the  amount  of  cash  flow  generated  would  be  reduced.  If  they  support  the  incumbent 
management’s decisions (even in the wake of poor performance as Franks et al., 2001, claim), we 
would have expected to see a higher degree of cash flow sensitivity. The non-significance of those 
parameter estimates in Table 8 may result from the fact that, across the sample, both effects may 
neutralize  one  another.  Our  findings  of  Table  8  do  not  contradict  the  free  cash  flow-based 
explanation as formulated by Hypotheses 1b and 1c. The evidence also does not reject Hypothesis 
2b:  the  negative  relationship  between  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  in  the  presence  of  major 
blockholdings held by financial institutions is consistent with the asymmetric information theory.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
In Table 9, we analyze the impact of corporate growth perspectives on cash flow sensitivity 
for firms with and without insider control. In the absence of insider control, the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity more than triples (from 0.031 to 0.099) in companies with high growth perspectives. This 
finding contradicts Hypothesis 1d, which states that the sensitivity is expected to be more outspoken 
in mature, firms with relatively low market-to-book values. The fact that there is a higher cash flow 
sensitivity  is  in  line  with  Hypothesis  2c,  which  relates  high  sensitivity  in  high-q  firms  to 
underinvestment problems. The reason why underinvestment is a problem especially in high-q firms 
results from asymmetric information between the firm and the capital markets and from the fact that 
the  fact  that high  growth  firms  have fewer tangible  assets  as  collateral (Almeida and Campello, 
2004).   
We  also  document that  insider ownership reduces the investment sensitivity to corporate 
liquidity both in high-q and low-q firms by about one third. In an agency framework, we would have   27 
expected to see the declining cash flow sensitivity along with rising insider ownership more clearly 
in firms with low growth since in mature firms it may be more difficult to generate positive NPV 
investment opportunities. As tables 7 and 8 document that the presence of blockholders can also have 
an effect on the investment decision. Consequently, in order to further investigate the impact of 
Tobin’s on the  investment-cash flow sensitivity, we analyze relative managerial voting power as 
measured by Shapley values for high and low growth firms in Table 10 (Panel C), that is, when we 
apply the SV approach. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
A high Shapley value (see section 4.1) for the management indicates that insiders have large 
ownership stakes and are pivotal in the formation of shareholder coalitions. Panel A of Table 10 
exhibits  that the  investment decision  of  firms in which the management has no voting power is 
significantly positively related to the internally generated funds of the firm. The (initially) negative 
relationship  between  insiders’  relative  voting  power  and  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  is 
sustained. However, these results do not provide evidence of managerial entrenchment as there is no 
statistical difference between the effect of SVs being between 0 and 1, and the effect of those equal 
to  1  (respectively,  intermediate  and  strong  relative  voting  power).  These  findings  corroborate 
Hypothesis 1a. At low levels of control, investments are strongly influenced by available cash flow. 
At increasing levels, cash flow sensitivities decrease substantially (from 0.070 to 0.023 or 0.027).  
Table 10 also tests in Panel B how cash flow sensitivities change with rising insider relative 
ownership for firms with a high probability of being liquidity constrained (they neither increase 
dividends nor repurchase equity). Henceforth, we label such firms as ‘liquidity constrained’ although 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that more restrictive definitions could be used.
15 We find a low 
positive correlation between investment and cash flow in firms which are not liquidity constrained 
and in which there is no insider control. In liquidity constrained firms, the investment-cash flow 
                                                            
15 In the definition of liquidity constraints, Kaplan and Zingales also include qualitative information about the 
firm. Still, their study is based on a tiny sample and their approach cannot be imitated for large samples of long 
time windows.    28 
sensitivity is almost four times stronger than in firms increasing the payout (0.135 versus 0.036). This 
evidence  fails  to  reject  Hypothesis  3,  according  to  which  investment is  sensitive to  cash  due to 
liquidity constraints. This suggests that management faces a wedge between the costs of internal and 
external financing and this wedge makes them forgo some investments when the amount of internally 
generated funds is insufficient. The panel also shows that intermediate and strong relative voting 
power exerted by insiders reduces the investment cash-flow sensitivity primarily in the subsample of 
the liquidity constrained firms (as the coefficients of the interaction terms of cash flow, liquidity 
constraints and insider control classes are significant and negative). The latter result is consistent 
with the free cash flow theory. 
Finally, Panel C of Table 10 examines the investment decisions for high and low growth 
firms subject to differing levels of relative insider voting power. We find that in both high and low 
growth firms without insider control, the investment decision is closely related to firms’ cash flow. 
Still, in the former firms, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is three times stronger. Relative insider 
voting power reduces the sensitivity substantially, which indicates that the agency costs theory of 
free  cash  flow  appears,  in  general,  to  be  a  more  plausible  explanation  than  the  asymmetric 
information hypothesis. The latter hypothesis, however, may partially explain the observed high cash 
flow sensitivity of investment of high-q firms.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
In  order  to  corroborate  the  results  specified  above,  we  further  examine  whether  or  not 
efficient  firms  invest more  when the available internally generated funds are abundant. Efficient 
firms are firms for which the growth perspectives measured by Tobin’s q are close to the optimally 
achievable  (hypothetical)  q,  which  we  call  efficient  q.  In  the  methodology  subsection  4.4.2,  we 
describe that the stochastic frontier of efficient q’s depends on corporate size, investment, turnover, 
operating margin and leverage. In addition, part of the error term of this model was modeled by 
insider and outsider ownership concentration. We call firms close to efficient frontier of optimal q’s, 
‘efficient firms’. This correction to Tobin’s q may be important because firms with high q may   29 
significantly underperform their optimally achievable q whereas firms with low q may be close to 
their optimum.  
In Panel A of Table 11, we show that investment in firms with low technical efficiency 
strongly depends on the available cash flow. The dependence of investment on cash is substantially 
reduced (by 40%) in firms with high technical efficiency or, in other words, in firms which optimally 
deploy their assets and achieve a Tobin’s q close to their (hypothetically) highest achievable one. 
This finding is consistent with both Hypotheses 1e and 2d. 
In order to disentangle the impact of the agency costs of free cash flow and of asymmetric 
information,  we  estimate  the  investment  equation  including  both  the  efficiency  and  growth 
dummies.
16 We find that higher efficiency has a similar effect on the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
of both groups of firms (efficient firms’ cash flow sensitivity of investment is reduced by 0.031 and 
by 0.061 for low-q and high-q firms, respectively; see Panel B).
17 This indicates that less efficient 
low-q firms suffer from higher agency cost of free cash flow, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1e. 
As the high growth firms (high efficient q) are unlikely to be affected by free cash flow problems, the 
analogous negative relationship between efficiency and investment-cash flow sensitivity indicates 
that these firms are affected by asymmetric information problems (Hypothesis 2d). 
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
Finally, we test Hypothesis 3 to verify whether liquidity constraints are the main reason for 
the observed investment-cash flow sensitivity in our sample. Cash flow sensitivity is expected to be 
more strongly positive in liquidity constrained firms. In Table 12, we classify firms that are not 
liquidity constrained as those firms which return free cash flow to the shareholders by repurchasing 
shares  (Panel  A)  and  by  increasing  the  dividend  payout  (Panel  B).  We  find  that  the  cash  flow 
sensitivity  is  reduced  in  firms  expected  not  to  suffer  from  liquidity  constraints.  The  cash  flow 
                                                            
16 We proxy growth opportunities here with efficient q in order to avoid the problem of Tobin’s q being a proxy 
for another explanatory variable, the firm’s efficiency. 
 
17  Although  the  parameters  of  the  two  interaction  term  are  not  significantly  different  from  zero  when 
considered separately, they are jointly statistically significant at 1% (with F = 9.45).   30 
sensitivity of firms that buy back their equity decreases by 0.004 for every 10% of repurchased 
equity value. Firms that increase dividends or keep them at the same level exhibit investment-cash 
flow sensitivity which is lower by 0.194, and 0.162, respectively, from the sensitivity of companies 
that reduce their level of cash disbursements. Finally, the sensitivity of firms that are classified as 
financially  constrained  (i.e.  they  reduce  dividends/keep  them  at  a  constant  level  and  do  not 
repurchase  equity)  is  higher  by  0.047  than  the  measure  calculated  for  their  non-constrained 
counterparts  (Panel  C).  These  findings  support  Hypothesis  3,  according  to  which  liquidity 
constraints, and not other factors – such as cash flow being a proxy for investment opportunities – are 
the main reason for the observed investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
6.  Conclusions  
 
This paper has investigated the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange in the 1990s. In general, we find that investments are strongly cash flow 
sensitive. Are those suboptimal investment decisions the result of either the agency costs of free cash 
flow  when  managers  with  too  much  discretion  overinvest  or  of  asymmetric  information  when 
managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk 
premium?  We  find  evidence  that  a  cash  flow-dependent  investment  policy  results  mainly  from 
agency problems. First, we document a significantly positive investment-cash flow sensitivity and 
show that this sensitivity depends on insider ownership in a non-monotonic way. For companies in 
which insiders own no or tiny share stakes, cash flow sensitivity is high. When insider control rises, 
cash  flow  sensitivity  is  reduced.  This  result  holds  both  for  firms  with  low  and  high  growth 
opportunities  (as  proxied  by  Tobin’s  q).  At  moderate  levels  of  insider  ownership,  cash  flow 
sensitivity  rises  which  may  be  explained  by  a  high  level  of  entrenchment  which  allows  for  the 
consumption of a high level of private benefits. For high insider ownership levels, that is, when 
management  internalizes  a  large  fraction  of  the  changes  in the firm’s value  resulting from  their 
actions, the investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases. Comparable results are obtained when we   31 
analyze the impact of relative insider control, as measured by Shapley values which take into account 
the distribution of voting rights over both insiders and outside blockholders. Consistent with our 
previous evidence, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is much lower in firms with strong insiders’ 
relative voting power. 
Furthermore, we find that outside blockholders appear to have an impact on the investment 
policy. Different types  of outside blockholders have different  abilities and  incentives  to monitor 
management and influence the firm’s investment decisions. Outside blockholders, such as financial 
institutions, the government, and industrial and commercial corporations (only at high control levels), 
reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. The negative relationship 
between  cash  flow  sensitivity  and  the  ownership  of  financial  institutions  is  consistent  with  the 
asymmetric  information  theory:  institutions  holding  an  equity  block  appear  to  reduce  the 
informational asymmetry between the firm and capital markets.  
We  also  find  a  negative  relationship  between  the  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  and 
corporate efficiency (as defined by the ratio of the firm’s Tobin’s q and to its optimally achievable 
(hypothetical) q). Lower efficiency in the subsample of low-q firms associated with a higher cash 
flow sensitivity of investment indicates that less efficient firms suffer from higher agency cost of free 
cash  flow.  An  analogous  relationship  for  high-q  companies  indicates  that  they  may  suffer  from 
informational asymmetries.  
Finally, we show the investment policy of companies that are expected not to be liquidity 
constrained  –  firms  that  repurchase  equity, augment  their dividend  pay-out or keep it stable but 
positive – does not depend on the generated periodic cash flow. This result supports the view that 
liquidity  constraints,  and  not  other  factors  –  such  as  cash  flow  being  a  proxy  for  investment 
opportunities – are the main reason for the observed cash flow sensitivity. 
  The results of this paper indicate that the agency costs of free cash flow appear to be the 
main source of the investment-cash flow sensitivity of the UK listed corporations in the post-Cadbury 
period. Therefore, from a policy perspective, it seems essential to pursue the further alignment of 
interests of managers and shareholders by stimulating effective shareholder monitoring and pay-for-
performance schemes. Furthermore, our findings indicate that the current disclosure practices and   32 
transparency requirements – in principle – do not lead to severe informational asymmetries between 
firms  and  capital  markets  that  would  prevent  corporations  from  pursuing  value-maximizing 
investment policies. Finally, our results indicate promising avenues for future research. Firstly, one 
can attempt to incorporate managerial remuneration and turnover in the investment model to analyze 
to  what  extent  the  disciplining devices  have  already translated into efficient investment policies. 
Secondly, an interesting research opportunity is to analyze the changes in the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment in the aftermath of (voluntary) changes in corporate disclosure. 
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Table 1  
Financial variables – descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the sample of 985 UK firms over the entire sample period. It denotes investment in 
fixed assets (change in the net fixed assets plus depreciation). Kt-1 denotes the beginning-of-the-year net fixed 
assets. CFt denotes cash flow. Salest (%) denotes (the percentage growth of) total revenues. TOTASSt denotes 
total assets. LEVt is the ratio of book value of debt to market value of the firm (market value is estimated as 
total assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalization). CURRt is the ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities. COVt is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest expense and tax corrected 
preferred dividend payments. MVt/BVt stands for the market-to-book value ratio (market value is estimated as 
total assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalization). Q
eff
t denotes the efficient Tobin’s q (defined 
as MVt/BVt * (EFFt)
-1, see Subsection 4.2.2). EFFt is a technical efficiency parameter (see Subsection 4.2.2). 
OperMart denotes the ratio of operating income before depreciation to revenues. PAYOUTt  is the ratio of 
dividends  to  earnings  before  interest  and  taxes.  DIVt  (%)  denotes  (the  percentage  growth  of)  dividends. 
B_BACKt stands for the value of repurchased stock. D_INCRt is the dummy corresponding to dividend increase. 
D_ZEROt is the dummy corresponding to constant dividend. BBACKt denotes the value of repurchased stock. 
BB_EQt represents the ratio of market value of repurchased stock to book equity. BB_CAPt is the ratio of 
market value of repurchased stock to market capitalization. ISSUESt denotes the value of equity issues. ISS_EQt 
is the ratio of market value of equity issues to book equity. ISS_CAPt denotes the ratio of market value of 
equity issues to market capitalization. 
  Mean 
 
Std. Dev.  Min  Max  25%  Median  75%  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Number of Firms  985                
Number of firm-years  4416               
Panel A: Corporate investment, size and assets structure           
It  3399  10249  -11800  36945  -311  404  3459  2.026  7.281 
Kt-1  68259  135466  917  549200  4781  13690  50258  2.731  9.437 
It/Kt-1  0.097  0.246  -0.279  0.793  -0.040  0.044  0.175  1.246  4.598 
CFt/Kt-1  0.779  1.173  -0.612  4.477  0.140  0.420  0.951  1.905  6.302 
Salest  393355  1805980  1  4.47E+07  24118  66276  197918  15.180  290.878 
Salest (%)  0.276  2.659  -1.000  109.965  -0.001  0.092  0.211  33.316  1276.463 
TOTASSt  324306  1544090  214  3.48E+07  18901  46918  148061  14.234  255.483 
LEVt  0.398  0.207  0.002  0.991  0.240  0.373  0.542  0.423  2.559 
CURRt  1.668  1.504  0.038  29.678  1.085  1.389  1.814  8.433  115.704 
COVt  16.5  33.4  -10.31  137.44  1.98  5.32  13.50  2.745  9.764 
Panel B: Growth opportunities and operating performance  
MVt/BVt  1.872  1.841  0.363  46.652  1.091  1.451  2.033  9.669  170.014 
Q
eff
t  3.610  6.675  0.385  196.488  1.213  1.672  2.678  8.696  162.171 
EFFt  0.846  0.259  0.100  1.000  0.871  0.940  0.986  -2.296  6.794 
OperMart  0.068  0.101  -0.206  0.254  0.029  0.071  0.122  -0.743  4.279 
ROEt  0.117  0.238  -0.506  0.593  0.044  0.129  0.231  -0.655  4.244 
Panel C: Dividend payout, buy-backs and rights issues           
PAYOUTt  0.202  0.185  -0.121  0.626  0.055  0.198  0.302  0.445  2.832 
DIVt  9330.7  44108.6  0  774999  220  1034  3728  10.751  139.395 
DIVt (%)  0.473  8.155  -1  511.667  0  0.092  0.277  55.946  3421.503 
D_INCRt  0.701  0.496  0  1  0  1  1  -0.787  1.619 
D_ZEROt  0.162  0.309  0  1  0  0  0  2.388  6.705 
Number of Buy-Backs   323               
BBACKt  1035  17647  0  945000  0  0  0  35.534  1640.027 
BB_EQt  0.007  0.057  0  0.804  0  0  0  11.458  147.598 
BB_CAPt  0.003  0.018  0  0.212  0  0  0  8.728  86.286 
Number of Issues  3577               
ISSUESt  2716  8123  0  42171  0  4  532  3.798  17.159 
ISS_EQt  0.108  0.292  0  1.461  0  0  0.011  3.268  13.394 
ISS_CAPt  0.038  0.092  0  0.378  0  0.001  0.005  2.693  9.217 
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Table 2 
Corporate investment levels over time 
Descriptive statistics on the level of corporate investment, It, for the sample of 985 UK firms for period 1993-
1998.  
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  All years 
No Obs.  761  809  854  882  902  204  4416 
Mean  2077  2717  5027  3255  3357  5067  3399 
Std. Dev  9044  9130  11066  10454  10753  10999  10249 
25%  -576  -225  -56  -372  -491  -121  -312 
Median  74  425  960  345  337  1098  404 
75%  1889  2673  4911  2256  3421  6413  3457 
Skewness  2.355  2.213  1.921  1.994  1.852  1.660  2.026 
Kurtosis  9.779  8.936  5.978  7.193  6.503  5.541  7.281 
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Table 3 
Ownership of the largest shareholder and of all the blockholders 
Ownership patterns in the sample companies calculated for the entire sample period. Panel A contains the data 
on the ownership of the single largest shareholder. Panel B describes the ownership by all shareholders whose 
stake is at least 5% of all shares outstanding. Panel C contains the statistics on Herfindahl index (HI) based on 
all blockholdings. HI is defined as S
N(OWNi)
2, where OWNi
  is the ownership of i-th blockholder, and i=1, 2,..., 
N. 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  All years 
Panel A: Ownership stake of the largest shareholder 
Mean  0.212  0.216  0.214  0.212  0.206  0.205  0.207  0.210 
Median  0.151  0.156  0.153  0.151  0.159  0.159  0.153  0.155 
Std. Dev  0.162  0.159  0.155  0.153  0.144  0.142  0.146  0.151 
Min  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.051  0.050 
Max  0.898  0.898  0.899  0.899  0.899  0.899  0.899  0.899 
Panel B: The accumulated ownership stakes of all blockholders  
Mean  0.404  0.394  0.388  0.388  0.379  0.377  0.391  0.394 
Median  0.385  0.380  0.375  0.378  0.374  0.360  0.384  0.379 
Std. Dev  0.206  0.202  0.200  0.190  0.182  0.188  0.186  0.199 
Min  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.050  0.051  0.050 
Max  0.988  0.993  0.978  0.938  0.985  0.985  0.899  0.993 
Panel C: The Herfindahl index of all large ownership stakes  
Mean  0.092  0.091  0.089  0.087  0.081  0.080  0.084  0.086 
Median  0.046  0.047  0.047  0.046  0.046  0.046  0.045  0.046 
Std. Dev  0.120  0.117  0.110  0.110  0.100  0.099  0.101  0.108 
Min  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003 
Max  0.806  0.806  0.808  0.808  0.808  0.808  0.808  0.808 
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Table 4 
Ownership and control by category of shareholder  
Ownership patterns by category of owner calculated for the entire sample period. Panel A contains the data on 
the largest blockholdings. Panel B contains the ownership data categorized with respect to the identity of a 
shareholder. Panel C contains the data on the single largest blockholdings. Panel D shows Shapley values of 
given  categories  of  blockholders.  Panel  E  contains  Shapley  values  of  the  single  largest  blockholdings. 
Herfindahl index is defined as S
N(OWNi)
2, where OWNi
  is the ownership of i-th blockholder, and i=1, 2,..., N. 
Shapley value is defined by Eq. (1). 
  Mean  Stand. 
Dev. 
Min  Q25%  Median  Q75%  Max  Skewness  Kurtosis  Firmyears 
with data 
Panel A: Aggregate statistics   
Sum of all 
stakes  
0.394  0.199  0.050  0.239  0.379  0.539  0.995  0.284  2.407  5631 
Largest 
share stake  
0.210  0.151  0.050  0.110  0.155  0.257  0.899  1.679  5.537  5631 
Sum of 
largest 3  
0.349  0.179  0.050  0.224  0.321  0.458  0.929  0.631  2.997  5631 
Herfindahl 3   0.083  0.108  0.003  0.021  0.041  0.093  0.808  2.626  11.252  5631 
Sum of 
largest 5  
0.388  0.194  0.050  0.239  0.376  0.526  0.991  0.296  2.491  5631 
Herfindahl 5   0.086  0.108  0.003  0.023  0.045  0.098  0.808  2.597  11.170  5631 
Panel B: Sum of all equity stakes by category of owner 
Institutions  0.203  0.167  0  0.066  0.177  0.305  0.954  0.886  3.692  5631 
  Banks  0.018  0.052  0  0  0  0  0.954  4.876  42.639  5631 
  Investment/   0.159  0.156  0  0  0.126  0.246  0.899  1.274  4.932  5631 
  pension funds                   
  Insurance   0.025  0.047  0  0  0  0.052  0.358  2.219  8.563  5631 
  Real estate   0.001  0.017  0  0  0  0  0.520  18.091  428.553  5631 




0.025  0.068  0  0  0  0  0.698  3.864  22.022  5631 
Government  0.0003  0.004  0  0  0  0  0.131  18.309  381.774  5631 
Insiders   0.104  0.176  0  0  0  0.148  0.871  1.819  5.415  5631 
  CEO  0.051  0.127  0  0  0  0  0.871  3.130  13.258  5631 
  Chairman  0.075  0.148  0  0  0  0.092  0.870  2.341  8.141  5631 
  Exec. Dir. 
  (ex CEO) 
0.053  0.124  0  0  0  0  0.742  2.809  11.019  5631 
  Non-Exec.  
  Dir. 
0.005  0.030  0  0  0  0  0.513  9.081  105.270  5631 
Panel C: Largest shareholding categorized by type of owner 
Institutions  0.158  0.110  0.050  0.100  0.131  0.173  0.899  2.975  14.408  3086 
  Banks  0.151  0.080  0.051  0.102  0.127  0.173  0.503  1.925  6.947  267 
  Investment/   0.167  0.116  0.050  0.105  0.137  0.181  0.899  2.905  13.470  2504 
  pension funds                   
  Insurance  0.090  0.035  0.050  0.063  0.082  0.109  0.259  1.399  5.698  287 
  Real estate   0.191  0.112  0.069  0.146  0.154  0.189  0.520  1.817  6.116  28 




0.169  0.112  0.050  0.089  0.134  0.239  0.698  1.666  6.747  236 
Insiders   0.287  0.169  0.050  0.156  0.239  0.384  0.870  0.880  2.864  1464 
  CEO  0.306  0.179  0.050  0.160  0.262  0.426  0.870  0.793  2.670  710 
  Chairman  0.307  0.173  0.054  0.170  0.260  0.434  0.870  0.732  2.551  1133 
  Exec. Dir.  
  (ex CEO) 
0.271  0.158  0.054  0.151  0.224  0.341  0.742  0.929  2.942  754 
  Non-Exec. 
  Dir. 
0.185  0.101  0.055  0.121  0.156  0.239  0.502  1.280  4.574  93 
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Panel D: Shapley Values of each category of owner  
Institutions  0.566  0.435  0  0  0.667  1  1  -0.270  1.311  5631 
  Banks  0.049  0.172  0  0  0  0  1  4.376  22.840  5631 
  Investment/  0.437  0.416  0  0  0.333  1  1  0.241  1.384  5631 
  pension funds                   
  Insurance  0.076  0.203  0  0  0  0  1  3.421  14.812  5631 
  Real estate   0.004  0.059  0  0  0  0  1  15.599  255.808  5631 




0.056  0.179  0  0  0  0  1  3.948  19.097  5631 
Insiders   0.230  0.005  0  0  0  0  0.167  24.924  682.436  5631 
  CEO  0.232  0.370  0  0  0  0.333  1  1.287  3.010  5631 
  Chairman  0.112  0.275  0  0  0  0  1  2.560  8.226  5631 
  Exec. Dir. 
  (ex CEO) 
0.174  0.335  0  0  0  0.167  1  1.784  4.605  5631 
  Non-Exec.  
  Dir. 
0.120  0.282  0  0  0  0  1  2.377  7.321  5631 
Panel E: Shapley Value  of the largest shareholder, categorized according to type of shareholder 
Institutions  0.667  0.325  0.143  0.333  0.500  1  1  -0.052  1.174  3086 
  Banks  0.657  0.326  0.181  0.333  0.500  1  1  0.015  1.166  267 
  Investment/  0.660  0.324  0.143  0.333  0.500  1  1  -0.008  1.184  2504 
  pension funds                   
  Insurance  0.734  0.328  0.162  0.333  1  1  1  -0.470  1.322  286 
  Real estate   0.762  0.326  0.300  0.333  1  1  1  -0.603  1.373  28 




0.680  0.324  0.200  0.333  0.600  1  1  -0.116  1.181  236 
Insiders   0.731  0.310  0.143  0.400  1  1  1  -0.386  1.329  1464 
  CEO  0.746  0.309  0.162  0.400  1  1  1  -0.494  1.431  710 
  Chairman  0.767  0.297  0.162  0.500  1  1  1  -0.587  1.524  1133 
  Exec. Dir. 
  (ex CEO) 
0.717  0.311  0.143  0.333  1  1  1  -0.287  1.258  754 
  Non-Exec.  
  Dir. 
0.695  0.327  0.186  0.200  1  1  1  -0.264  1.306  157   42 
Table 5 
Technical efficiency – the stochastic frontier model 
Specification of the stochastic efficient frontier model. The dependent variable in the main model (Panel A) is 
the market-to-book ratio, MVt/BVt. LnSalest is the natural logarithm of revenues. It/Kt-1 represents the ratio of 
investment to the lagged capital stock. Kt-1/Salest is the capital intensity. OperMart is the operating margin, and 
LEVt  denotes  the  total  leverage  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  market  value of  equity. Panel  B shows  the 
parameters of the inefficiency model. The dependent variable is vt, which is a non-negative random component 
(distributed according to the truncated normal distribution N(Ztm, ￿v
2), where Zt denotes the vector of variables 
affecting the inefficiency level and m is a vector of unknown parameters). INSt is the insiders’ share of stock. 
Blockt  denotes  the  other  blockholders’  share  of  stock.  Panel  C  contains  descriptive  statistics  of  technical 
efficiency, EFFt, defined as one minus ratio of vt to MVt/BVt. 
Panel A: Stochastic frontier model  
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-statistic  P>|t| 
lnSalest  0.432  0.894  0.483  0.629 
(lnSalest)
2  -0.217  0.448  -0.484  0.628 
It/Kt-1  0.004  0.002  1.777  0.076 
Kt-1/Salest  -0.032  0.009  -3.759  0.000 
OperMart  -0.694  0.082  -8.513  0.000 
LEVt  -0.352  0.108  -3.248  0.001 
Const.  0.503  0.173  2.909  0.004 
Panel B: Inefficiency model 
INSt  0.108  0.061  1.774  0.076 
(INSt)
2  -0.672  0.760  0.884  0.377 
Blockt  0.153  0.108  1.415  0.157 
(Blockt)
2  -0.116  0.560  -0.207  0.836 
Const.  -0.324  0.043  -7.451  0.000 
LR test of the one-side error (c
2) :      42.59     
Panel C: Technical efficiency – descriptive statistics 
  Mean 
 
Std. Dev.  Min  Max  25%  Median  75%  Skewness  Kurtosis 
EFFt  0.846  0.259  0.100  1.000  0.871  0.940  0.986  -2.296  6.794 
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 Table 6 
Investment model with managerial and outside block ownership 
The investment model based on a fixed effects estimation. The dependent variable is the ratio of investment to 
the lagged capital stock, It/Kt-1. Panel A shows results for all firms in the dataset (3445 firm-years). Panel B 
shows the estimation results with interaction terms including dummies related to insider ownership and outside 
block ownership. MVt-1/BVt-1 stands for beginning-of-the-period market-to-book ratio. CFt/Kt-1 stands for cash 
flow divided by beginning-of-the-period capital stock. D_INSt is a dummy variable which equals 1 if insider 
ownership  exceeds  median  level.  D_Blockt  is  a  dummy  variable  which  equals  1  if  outside  blockholders’ 
ownership is above median. 
Panel A: Investment model for all firm-years 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-statistic  P>|t| 
CFt/Kt-1  0.109  0.004  28.66  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.001  0.019  0.05  0.964 
Const.  0.049  0.040  1.25  0.212 
R
2- within  0.257   F(2,2508)  433.90 
R
2- between  0.275   Number of obs.  3445 
R
2- overall  0.265   Numb. of groups  935 
Panel B: Sample with interaction dummies associated with high concentration of managerial 
ownership and high ownership concentration of other blockholders 
CFt/Kt-1  0.096  0.010  10.04  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.002  0.015  0.12  0.904 
CFt/Kt-1*D_INSt  -0.035  0.010  -3.40  0.001 
CFt/Kt-1 *D_Blockt  -0.048  0.011  -4.39  0.000 
CFt/Kt-1*D_INSt 
*D_Blockt 
0.053  0.015  3.36  0.001 
Const.  0.097  0.031  3.21  0.001 
R
2- within  0.134   F(5,2382)  73.95 
R
2- between  0.054   Number of obs.  3312 
R
2- overall  0.112   Numb. of groups  935 
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Table 7 
The non-monotonic relation between ownership and cash flow  
Random effects specification of the basic investment model with interaction terms involving cash flow and the 
level of insider ownership. The dependent variable is the ratio of investment to the lagged capital stock, It/Kt-1. 
MVt-1/BVt-1 stands for beginning-of-the-period market-to-book ratio. CFt/Kt-1 stands for cash flow divided by 
capital stock. INSt is the percentage stake of ownership held by insiders, and Blockt is the stake of ownership 
held  by  other  blockholders.  INS16t  is  the  fraction  of  insider  ownership,  INSt,  lower  than  16%  (INS16t  = 
min[0.16;  INSt]),  INS1622t  is  the  fraction  of  insider  ownership  between  16%  and  22%  (INS1622t  = 
max[0;min[INSt-0.16; 0]]), INS22t is the fraction of insider ownership higher than 22% (INS22t = max[INSt-
0.22; 0]). D_Blockt is a dummy variable which equals 1 if outside blockholders’ ownership is above median. 
Panel A: The non-monotonic relation between cash flow sensitivity and insider control 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-statistic  P>|t| 
CFt/Kt-1  0.086  0.009  9.31  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.011  0.011  0.97  0.330 
CFt/Kt-1*INSt  -0.183  0.106  -1.73  0.084 
CFt/Kt-1*(INSt)
2
  -0.016  0.488  -0.03  0.974 
CFt/Kt-1*(INSt)
3  0.259  0.624  0.42  0.678 
CFt/Kt-1*Blockt  -0.064  0.056  -1.13  0.257 
CFt/Kt-1*(Blockt)
2  0.031  0.094  0.33  0.741 
Const.  0.099  0.037  2.67  0.008 
R
2- within  0.140     c
2(7)  471.13 
R
2- between  0.064     Number of obs.  3312 
R
2- overall  0.121     Numb. of groups  925 
Panel B: Cash flow sensitivity and insider control at various ownership thresholds 
CFt/Kt-1  0.088  0.006  13.98  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.012  0.012  1.03  0.303 
CFt/Kt-1*INS16t  -0.522  0.101  -5.16  0.000 
CFt/Kt-1*INS1622t  0.811  0.346  2.35  0.019 
CFt/Kt-1*INS22t  -0.249  0.091  -2.73  0.006 
CFt/Kt-1*Blockt  -0.065  0.022  -2.93  0.003 
Const.  0.100  0.037  2.71  0.006 
R
2- within  0.144     c
2(6)  487.92 
R
2- between  0.067     Number of obs.  3312 
R
2- overall  0.124     Numb. of groups  925 
Panel C: The impact of outsider blockholdings on sensitivity-insider ownership relationship 
CFt/Kt-1  0.101  0.006  18.14  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.005  0.012  0.41  0.681 
CFt/Kt-1*INS16t  -0.767  0.125  -6.12  0.000 
CFt/Kt-1*INS1622t  0.516  0.427  1.21  0.227 
CFt/Kt-1*INS22t  -0.099  0.108  -0.92  0.359 
CFt/Kt-1*INS16t 
*D_Blockt 
0.535  0.207  2.59  0.010 
CFt/Kt-1*INS1622t 
*D_Blockt 
1.529  0.822  1.86  0.063 
CFt/Kt-1*INS22t 
*D_Blockt 
-0.940  0.461  -2.04  0.041 
CFt/Kt-1*D_Blockt  -0.048  0.007  -6.66  0.000 
Const.  0.109  0.037  2.97  0.003 
R
2- within  0.156     c
2(9)  536.36 
R
2- between  0.073     Number of obs.  3312 
R
2- overall  0.133     Numb. of groups  925 
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Table 8 
Investment model with cash flow and piece-wise block ownership  
Fixed effects specification of the basic investment model with interaction terms involving cash flow and level 
of control held by different types of shareholder. The dependent variable is the ratio of investment to the lagged 
capital  stock,  It/Kt-1.  MVt-1/BVt-1 stands  for  beginning-of-the-period  market-to-book  ratio.  CFt/Kt-1  stands  for 
cash flow divided by capital stock. INS16t is the fraction of insider ownership, INSt, lower than 16% (INS16t = 
min[0.16;  INSt]),  INS1622t  is  the  fraction  of  insider  ownership  between  16%  and  22%  (INS1622t  = 
max[0;min[INSt-0.16; 0]]), INS22t is the fraction of insider ownership higher than 22% (INS22t = max[INSt-
0.22; 0]). FLt is the fraction of ownership by financial institutions, Ft, lower than 25% (FLt = min[0.25; Ft]), 
FHt  is  the  fraction  of  ownership  by  financial  institutions  higher  than  25%  (FHt  =  max[Ft-0.25;  0]).  The 
remaining variables are defined analogously, with I referring to industrial and commercial companies, NE to 
non-executive directors, O to other individuals, and G to the government.  
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-statistic  P>|t| 
CFt/Kt-1  0.088  0.008  11.43  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.013  0.015  0.84  0.401 
CFt/Kt-1*INS16t  -0.713  0.129  -5.52  0.000 
CFt/Kt-1*INS1622t  1.030  0.400  2.57  0.010 
CFt/Kt-1*INS22t  -0.209  0.101  -2.02  0.038 
CFt/Kt-1*FLt  -0.090  0.051  -1.79  0.010 
CFt/Kt-1*FHt  -0.059  0.056  -1.05  0.296 
CFt/Kt-1*ILt  0.909  0.118  7.72  0.000 
CFt/Kt-1*IHt  -0.915  0.170  -5.38  0.000 
CFt/Kt-1*NELt  0.355  0.214  1.66  0.097 
CFt/Kt-1*NEHt  0.101  0.502  0.20  0.840 
CFt/Kt-1*OLt  -0.309  0.198  -1.57  0.118 
CFt/Kt-1*OHt  2.633  1.027  2.56  0.010 
CFt/Kt-1*GLt  -62.041  7.705  -8.05  0.000 
Const.  0.066  0.031  2.13  0.034 
R
2- within  0.186     F(14, 2373)  38.75 
R
2- between  0.052     Number of obs.  3312 
R
2- overall  0.128     Number of groups  925 
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Table 9 
Investment model with insider ownership and growth opportunities 
Fixed effects specification of the investment model. The dependent variable is the ratio of investment to the 
lagged capital stock, It/Kt-1. The model is estimated with interaction dummies related to insider ownership and 
growth opportunities. MVt-1/BVt-1 stands for beginning-of-the-period market-to-book ratio. CFt/Kt-1 stands for 
cash flow divided by capital stock. D_INSt is a dummy variable which equals 1 if insider ownership exceeds 
median level. D_Qt-1 is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the beginning-of-the-period market-to-book ratio is 
above median. 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-statistic  P>|t| 
CFt/Kt-1  0.031  0.006  4.90  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  -0.010  0.015  -0.67  0.505 
CFt/Kt-1*D_INSt  -0.010  0.012  -0.79  0.428 
CFt/Kt-1*D_Qt-1  0.066  0.009  6.99  0.000 
CFt/Kt-1 
*D_INSt*D_Qt-1 
-0.017  0.015  -1.12  0.261 
Const.  0.112  0.030  3.72  0.000 
R
2- within  0.150   F(5, 2382)  84.22 
R
2- between  0.057   Number of obs.  3312 
R
2- overall  0.122   Numb. of groups  925 
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Table 10 
Investment model with managerial SVs, liquidity constraints and growth opportunities 
Investment model with proxies for differing managerial Shapley values (SVs) for the entire sample (random 
effects  specification),  differing  degree  of  liquidity  constraints  and  differing  degree  of  growth  opportunities 
(both fixed effects specification). The dependent variable, It/Kt-1, is the ratio of investment to the lagged capital 
stock. MVt-1/BVt-1 stands for beginning-of-the-period market-to-book ratio. CFt/Kt-1 stands for cash flow divided 
by capital stock. D_0<SV<1t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if managerial Shapley value is between 0 and 
1. D_SV=1t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if managerial Shapley value is 1. D_Qt-1 is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if the beginning-of-the-period market-to-book ratio is above median. D_CONSTRt is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if a firm is financially constrained, i.e. it reduces the dividend/keeps it at the constant 
level AND does not buy back its shares.  
Panel A: All sample firms 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-statistic  P>|t| 
CFt/Kt-1  0.070  0.003  20.79  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.015  0.011  1.35  0.179 
CFt/Kt-1*D_0<SV<1t   -0.046  0.016  -2.94  0.003 
CFt/Kt-1*D_SV=1t  -0.043  0.007  -6.63  0.000 
Const.  0.090  0.037  2.44  0.015 
R
2- within  0.140   c
2(4)  477.13 
R
2- between  0.069   Number of obs.  3312 
R
2- overall  0.124   Numb. of groups  925 
Panel B: Constrained vs. non-constrained firms 
CFt/Kt-1  0.036  0.005  7.59  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.014  0.015  0.92  0.346 
CFt/Kt-1*D_0<SV<1t  -0.010  0.015  -0.66  0.509 
CFt/Kt-1*D_SV=1t  -0.017  0.011  -1.56  0.119 
CFt/Kt-1*D_CONSTRt-1  0.099  0.008  12.53  0.000 
CFt/Kt-1*D_0<SV<1t 
*D_CONSTRt-1 
-0.037  0.080  -0.46  0.645 
CFt/Kt-1*D_SV=1t    
*D_CONSTRt-1 
-0.094  0.014  -6.66  0.000 
Const.  0.073  0.030  2.43  0.015 
R
2- within  0.178   F(7,2207)  68.26 
R
2- between  0.036   Number of obs.  3108 
R
2- overall  0.116   Numb. of groups  894 
Panel C: Firms with high q vs. firms with low q 
CFt/Kt-1  0.034  0.006  5.66  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  -0.012  0.015  -0.83  0.408 
CFt/Kt-1*D_0<SV<1t  -0.002  0.052  -0.04  0.971 
CFt/Kt-1*D_SV=1t  -0.029  0.013  -2.21  0.027 
CFt/Kt-1*D_Qt-1  0.071  0.008  9.11  0.000 
CFt/Kt-1*D_0<SV<1t 
*D_Qt-1 
-0.080  0.055  -1.46  0.146 
CFt/Kt-1*D_SV=1t 
*D_Qt-1 
-0.045  0.015  -2.91  0.004 
Const.  0.112  0.030  3.76  0.000 
R
2- within  0.180   F(7,2380)  74.76 
R
2- between  0.071   Number of obs.  3312 
R
2- overall  0.146   Numb. of groups  925 
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Table 11 
Investment model with technical efficiency 
Fixed effects specification of the investment model with the interaction terms involving technical efficiency. 
The  dependent  variable  is the ratio of investment to the lagged capital stock, It/Kt-1. MVt-1/BVt-1 stands for 
beginning-of-the-period market-to-book ratio. CFt/Kt-1 stands for cash flow divided by capital stock. D_EFFt-1 
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if beginning-of-the-period technical efficiency (cf. subsection 4.4.2) is 
above median. D_Q
eff
t-1 is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the beginning-of-the-period efficient q is above 
median.  
Panel A: Investment model with technical efficiency  
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-statistic  P>|t| 
CFt/Kt-1  0.119  0.004  28.99  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.010  0.020  0.52  0.606 
CFt/Kt-1*D_EFFt-1  -0.047  0.008  5.96  0.000 
Const.  0.045  0.039  1.14  0.255 
R
2- within  0.267     F(3,2507)  305.06 
R
2- between  0.259     Number of obs.  3445 
R
2- overall  0.270     Number of firms  935 
Panel B: Investment model with technical efficiency and efficient q 
CFt/Kt-1  0.175  0.027  6.46  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.019  0.020  0.99  0.322 
CFt/Kt-1*D_ Q
eff
t-1  -0.056  0.027  -2.08  0.037 





-0.030  0.033  -0.89  0.372 
Const.  0.019  0.040  0.46  0.643 
R
2- within  0.274     F(5,2505)  188.93 
R
2- between  0.254     Number of obs.  3445 
R
2- overall  0.271     Number of firms  935 
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Table 12 
Investment model for firms buying back equity and increasing dividends  
Fixed effects specification of the basic investment model with the interaction term involving cash flow and 
technical efficiency. The dependent variable is the ratio of investment to the lagged capital stock, It/Kt-1. MVt-
1/BVt-1 stands for beginning-of-the-period market-to-book ratio. CFt/Kt-1 stands for cash flow divided by capital 
stock. BB_EQt is the ratio of the value of repurchased stock to equity capital. D_INCRt is a dummy variable 
indicating that the firm increases its dividends. D_ZEROt is a dummy variable indicating that the firm does not 
change its dividends. The firms with financing constraints of Panel C, refrain both from buying back shares and 
from  increasing  their  dividends.  D_CONSTRt  is  a  dummy  variable  which  equals  1  if  a  firm  is  financially 
constrained, i.e. it reduces the dividend/keeps it at the constant level AND does not buy back its shares. 
Panel A: Investment model with firms buying back shares 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-statistic  P>|t| 
CFt/Kt-1  0.111  0.004  28.81  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  -0.001  0.020  -0.03  0.973 
CFt/Kt-1*BB_EQt-1  -0.044  0.016  -2.71  0.007 
Const.  0.053  0.040  1.31  0.189 
R
2- within  0.259   F(3,2507)  292.43 
R
2- between  0.276   Number of obs.  3445 
R
2- overall  0.267   Numb. of groups  935 
Panel B: Investment model with firms increasing dividend payout 
CFt/Kt-1  0.227  0.005  44.41  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  -0.003  0.017  0.19  0.850 
CFt/Kt-1*D_INCRt-1  -0.194  0.007  -27.49  0.000 
CFt/Kt-1*D_ZEROt-1  -0.162  0.007  -22.35  0.000 
Const.  0.085  0.034  2.45  0.015 
R
2- within  0.453   F(4,2506)  519.48 
R
2- between  0.336   Number of obs.  3445 
R
2- overall  0.418   Numb. of groups  935 
Panel C: Investment model with financing constraints 
CFt/Kt-1  0.031  0.005  6.36  0.000 
MVt-1/BVt-1  0.006  0.018  0.31  0.757 
CFt/Kt-1*CONSTRt-1  0.047  0.007  6.46  0.000 
Const.  0.093  0.036  2.59  0.010 
R
2- within  0.090   F(3.2316)  76.25 
R
2- between  0.072   Number of obs.  3223 
R
2- overall  0.082   Numb. of groups  904 
 
 
 
 